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“PLAY IN THE JOINTS” AND A PLAYGROUND:
BUILDING A NEW TEST POST-TRINITY LUTHERAN
Jonathan Zator*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Religion Clauses face renewed scrutiny following the
“marquee church-state case”1 of 2017 and one of the year’s
“most important rulings.”2 In Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia,
Inc. v. Comer,3 the United States Supreme Court applied the “play
in the joints” doctrine to a church playground.4 For the first time
in history, the Supreme Court held “that the Constitution
requires the government to provide public funds directly to a
church.”5 Historically, the Court has reasoned that “there is ‘play
in the joints’ between what the Establishment Clause permits and
what the Free Exercise Clause compels.”6 Now, applying the
“strictest scrutiny,”7 the Court found that Missouri violated the
Free Exercise Clause when it denied Trinity Lutheran public
funding for playground resurfacing solely because of the
organization’s religious status.8 There is room for “playing”
between the two Religion Clauses, but now one side outweighs
the other. The seesaw is off-balance.
This Note discusses the Trinity Lutheran decision,
responds to its criticism, and proposes a new test for similar cases
undoubtedly on the horizon. Part II provides information on the
Religion Clauses and Trinity Lutheran’s facts. Part III
summarizes the Court’s opinion and holding. Part IV details
criticism from concurring Justices, dissenting Justices, and legal
scholars. To answer the criticisms, Part V proposes a new “play
in the joints” test, called the “Seesaw Test,” for courts to use
when the government denies a public benefit based on religion.
The test would likely be renamed in the future, but this name will
be used for this Note. The Seesaw Test has two parts to decide
for a religious party or the government. First, the court should
*

J.D. Candidate, Class of 2019, University of North Carolina School of Law; Staff
Member, First Amendment Law Review.
1
Richard W. Garnett & Jackson C. Blais, Religious Freedom and Recycled Tires: The
Meaning and Implications of Trinity Lutheran, 2016–2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV., 105,
105.
2
Erwin Chemerinsky, Waiting for Gorsuch: October Term 2016, 20 GREEN BAG 2D 351,
352 (2017), http://www.greenbag.org/v20n4/v20n4_articles_chemerinsky.pdf.
3
137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
4
Id. at 2019. For brevity, in-text this case will be referred to as Trinity Lutheran.
5
Id. at 2027 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2024–25.
6
Id. at 2019.
7
Id. at 2021–22.
8
Id. at 2024–25.
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balance both sides’ arguments to decide whether the public
benefit was denied because of past or present religious status or
because of future religious use. Second, the weight either shifts
against the government or the religious party. If the denial was
based on religious status, then the government must show
excessive entanglement or endorsement. However, if the denial
was based on religious use, then the religious party must show
minimal entanglement and incidental endorsement. When this
situation arises, the Seesaw Test requires an analysis of both the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. This evaluation is in
contrast with what the Court did in Trinity Lutheran when it
effectively ignored any Establishment Clause analysis.9 Part VI
applies the Seesaw Test to demonstrate its functionality with the
Trinity Lutheran decision and various other issues.
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND FACTS OF TRINITY
LUTHERAN
A. The Religion Clauses, “Play in the Joints,” and Blaine Provisions
A foundational knowledge of the Religion Clauses is
necessary to understand Trinity Lutheran, its criticism, and the
“Seesaw Test.” The First Amendment has two religion clauses:
the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.10 The
narrow original understanding is that the Clauses were intended
to “prevent religious persecution” and the instatement of a
federally established religion.11 The people wanted to allow “the
Catholic and the Protestant, the Calvinist and the Arminian, the
Jew and the Infidel, [to] sit down at the common table of the
national councils without any inquisition into their faith, or
mode of worship.”12 Also, the people wanted “the whole power
9

See id. at 2019; see also id. at 2028 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting the Court’s
“silence” on this issue).
10
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Establishment Clause states: “Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion.” Id. The Free Exercise Clause states:
“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].” Id.
Madison’s original proposal for an amendment on religion stated: “[T]he civil rights
of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any
national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in
any manner, or on any pretext infringed.” 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 434 (1789)
(Joseph Gales, ed., 1834); Madison’s Notes for the Bill of Rights, LIBRARY OF CONG.,
https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/rel06.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2018)
(quoting James Madison’s notes at the First Congress).
11
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 112-9., at 1073 (2d Sess. 2017),
https://www.congress.gov/content/conan/pdf/GPO-CONAN-2017.pdf
[hereinafter CONAN]; see also T. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 224–25 (3d ed. 1898).
12
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
703 (Carolina Acad. Press 1987) (1833).
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over the subject of religion . . . left exclusively to the state
governments, to be acted upon according to [the state’s] own
sense of justice, and the state constitutions.”13 Contrast this with
the broader view that the Clauses were meant to erect “a wall of
separation between church and state”14 at both the state and
federal levels.15 In the 1940s, the Court extended the Religion
Clauses to the states,16 but “the Court remains sharply split on
how to interpret both clauses.”17
In Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing,18
the Supreme Court held that the Establishment Clause bars the
government from passing laws that “aid one religion,” “prefer
one religion over another,” or “aid all religions.”19 Today, courts
utilize three different tests to determine whether government
action violates the Establishment Clause. First, there is the
“coercion test,” which asks whether government action directs
individuals to engage in a formal religious exercise.20 However,
some Justices have criticized this test for making the
13

Id. at 702–03.
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
15
See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
16
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (Free Exercise Clause); Everson v.
Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (Establishment Clause).
17
CONAN, supra note 11, at 1074.
18
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
19
Id. at 15. “Establishment Clause jurisprudence since, whatever its twists and turns,
maintains this view.” CONAN, supra note 11, at 1073 n.11. In more specific detail,
the Court held:
The “establishment of religion” clause of the
First Amendment means at least this: Neither a
state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another. Neither can force nor influence a
person to go to or to remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief
or disbelief in any religion. No person can be
punished for entertaining or professing religious
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or
non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever form they may adopt to
teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can, openly or secretly,
participate in the affairs of any religious
organizations or groups and vice versa. In the
words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to
erect “a wall of separation between Church and
State.”
Everson, 330 U.S. at 15–16 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164
(1878)).
20
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592–93 (1992).
14
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Establishment Clause a “virtual nullity.”21 Second, there is the
“endorsement test,” which looks to the context of each case to
see if any reasonable observer would deem government to be
endorsing religion.22 Scholars and Justices also criticize the
endorsement test for being “too amorphous to provide adequate
guidance.”23 Third, there is the Lemon test, which “remain[s] the
primary standard of Establishment Clause validity”24 and has
been used in recent Establishment Clause decisions.25 The Lemon
test’s three prongs declare that (1) a law must have a “secular . .
. purpose”; (2) “its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion”; and (3) it “must not foster
an excessive government entanglement with religion.”26 The first
prong, a secular purpose, frequently passes the Lemon test, and
there is little disagreement among justices and scholars on this
21

CONAN, supra note 11, at 1076–77 (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 621 (Souter, J.,
concurring)); see also Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 623 (1989)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Logically,
coercing non-adherents to “support or participate in any religion or its exercise,” Cty.
of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659–660 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part), forces those individuals to forgo their Free Exercise right.
Compelling (i.e., coercing) support for religious establishments inherently violates a
citizen’s ability to freely exercise their religion.
22
Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 597.
23
CONAN, supra note 11, at 1076–77; see Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 675–77
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Capitol
Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 768 n.3 (1995) (opinion of
Scalia, J.). This test relies on the Court deciding if a “reasonable observer” would
view the government action as endorsement or disapproval. See Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Allegheny Cty., 492 U.S. at 625
(1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village v. Grumet,
512 U.S. 687, 712 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring). This gives too little guidance
for lower courts to make decisions. Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 675–77 (Kennedy,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
24
CONAN, supra note 11, at 1076. The “coercion test”—whether government action
directs formal religious exercise as to encourage or influence participation of those
who object religiously to said exercise, Lee, 505 U.S. at 592–93—is criticized for
making the Establishment Clause irrelevant, CONAN, supra note 11, at 1076–77.
The “endorsement test,” which looks into context to see if any reasonable observer
would deem government to be endorsing religion, Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 597,
is criticized for being “too amorphous to provide adequate guidance,” CONAN,
supra note 11, at 1077.
25
CONAN, supra note 11, at 1076 n.29 (“Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997)
(upholding under the Lemon tests the provision of remedial educational services by
public school teachers to sectarian elementary and secondary schoolchildren on the
premises of the sectarian schools); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290
(2000) (holding unconstitutional under the Lemon tests, as well as under the coercion
and endorsement tests, a school district policy permitting high school students to
decide by majority vote whether to have a student offer a prayer over the public
address system prior to home football games); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793
(2000) (upholding under the Lemon tests a federally funded program providing
instructional materials and equipment to public and private elementary and
secondary schools, including sectarian schools).”).
26
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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prong.27 The second and third prongs, primary effect and
excessive entanglement, have “proven much more divisive.”28
Ultimately, “shoehorning” all Establishment Clause cases into
any one test may be inappropriate,29 and instead, “different
contexts may call for different approaches.”30
In Free Exercise31 cases, by contrast, the Court uses
different levels of scrutiny32 to review government actions that
interfere with religion. In most of these cases, “formal neutrality”
is the common standard.33 Stated in Employment Division, Oregon
Department of Human Resources v. Smith,34 “the right of free
exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on
the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his
religion prescribes (or proscribes).’”35 However, the Supreme
Court has been “inconsistent” when distinguishing between
“belief” and “conduct.”36 In recent years, some “religiously
27

CONAN, supra note 11, at 1083. “There are adequate legitimate, non-sectarian
bases for legislation to assist nonpublic, religious schools: preservation of a healthy
and safe educational environment for all school children, promotion of pluralism and
diversity among public and nonpublic schools, and prevention of overburdening of
the public-school system that would accompany the financial failure of private
schools.” Id.; see also Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S.
646, 653–54 (1980); 444 U.S. at 665 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229, 240 (1977) (plurality opinion); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973); 413 U.S. at 805 (Burger, J., dissenting);
413 U.S. at 812–13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 413 U.S. at 813 (White, J.,
dissenting).
28
CONAN, supra note 11, at 1083.
29
Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 719 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment); see also CONAN, supra note 11, at 1077.
30
CONAN, supra note 11, at 1077; see also Grumet, 512 U.S. at 719 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
31
“The Free Exercise Clause . . . withdraws from legislative power, state and federal,
the exertion of any restraint on the free exercise of religion. Its purpose is to secure
religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil
authority.” Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222–23 (1963). The
Clause bars “governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such.” Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S 398, 402 (1963). The government cannot “impede the observance of
one or all religions or . . . discriminate invidiously between religions . . . even though
the burden may be characterized as being only indirect.” Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
32
CONAN, supra note 11, at 1077. For the purposes of this Note, only two standards
are relevant.
33
Id. “Academics as well as the Justices grapple with the extent to which religious
practices as well as beliefs are protected by the Free Exercise Clause.” Id. at 1120
n.257.
34
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
35
Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)) (emphasis added). For this doctrine’s lineage, see generally Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Jacobson
v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
36
CONAN, supra note 11, at 1120. The Court “has consistently affirmed that the
Free Exercise Clause protects religious beliefs, [but] protection for religiously
motivated conduct has waxed and waned over the years.” Id. at 1123.
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motivated conduct” has been protected from “generally
applicable prohibitions.”37 One reason for this is because
intentional government discrimination against a single religion
triggers strict scrutiny.38 Everson held that the government
“cannot
exclude
individual
Catholics,
Lutherans,
Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers,
Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of their
faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare
legislation.”39 Specifically, if a government action targets
individuals, people, or groups for “special disabilities” because
of “religious status,”40 then the law must be narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling interest. Overall, religious observers must be
protected “against unequal treatment.”41
There is a balancing act between the opposing Religion
Clauses. Casting one clause in “absolute terms,” and expanding
it “to a logical extreme,” would kick the second off of the
seesaw.42 The Court has avoided this absurdity.43 In Walz v. Tax
Commission of the City of New York,44 the Court explicitly stated
that “there is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent
neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without
[governmental] sponsorship and without interference.”45 More
specifically, in practice, there are some required “free-exercisemandated accommodations” that do not violate the

37

CONAN, supra note 11, at 1120–21. Most examples involve unemployment
benefits. See generally Frazee v. Ill. Dept. of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989)
(requiring unemployment benefits for a person with sincere religious beliefs who did
not belong to a particular church or sect and who did not claim that refusal to work
on Sunday was based upon teaching of an established religious body); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 107 (1987) (requiring
unemployment benefits when job loss resulted from change in religious beliefs after
employment); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981)
(requiring unemployment benefits for religious refusal to participate in arms
production); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (requiring unemployment
benefits to individuals who, for religious reasons, refused to work on Saturdays).
Another historically notable example concerns children’s education. See Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (holding that an Amish parent is not required to
send their children to complete compulsive education).
38
See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546
(1993). Strict scrutiny means that, to remain valid, a law must be narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling interest. For two examples of this judicial standard of review, see
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963).
39
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (emphasis in original).
40
See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 533.
41
See id. at 542.
42
Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668–69 (1970).
43
See, e.g., id. at 669; see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005); Locke v.
Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004).
44
397 U.S. 664 (1970).
45
Id. at 669 (emphasis added); see also Cutter, 544 U.S. at 713; Locke, 540 U.S. at 718.
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Establishment Clause46 and some optional religious
accommodations that do not create an establishment of
religion.47 This is the “play in the joints” doctrine.48 In principle,
this concept has been well accepted by the Court,49 but the Court
has “struggled to find a neutral course between the two Religion
Clauses.”50 Cases decided after Walz fleshed out just how much
the government can play in the joints without getting hurt.51 In
short, “equal treatment is not establishment,”52 but the
government must not go “too far” when promoting Free
Exercise,53 and must not “aid one religion,” “prefer one religion
over another,” or “aid all religions.”54
In 1876, Senator James G. Blaine proposed an
amendment to the United States Constitution, which failed in
the Senate,55 but “would have prohibited states from directing
public funds or lands to the use or control of ‘religious sects or
denominations.’”56 Accordingly, scholars call these provisions
“Blaine Amendments” or “Baby Blaines.”57 Today, nearly forty
46

CONAN, supra note 11, at 1121. “This Court has long recognized that government
may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and that it may do so
without violating the Establishment Clause.” Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 144–45 (1987). For examples, see supra note 37 and
accompanying text.
47
CONAN, supra note 11, at 1121; see also, e.g., Walz, 397 U.S. at 669 (holding that
grants of tax exemption to religious organizations do not violate the Establishment
Clause); Cutter, 544 U.S. at 713 (holding that, under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), facilities that accept federal funds cannot
deny prisoners accommodations that are necessary to engage in activities for the
practice of their own religious beliefs).
48
Although the Court does not specifically call “play in the joints” a doctrine, for the
purposes of this Note, “play in the joints” will be referred to either as a doctrine or
“the Doctrine.”
49
See e.g., Walz, 397 U.S. at 669 (emphasis added); see also Cutter, 544 U.S. at 713;
Locke, 540 U.S. at 718.
50
Walz, 397 U.S. at 668.
51
See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 713 (holding that the government can give accommodations
to prisoners to practice religious beliefs); Locke, 540 U.S. at 715 (upholding a publicly
funded scholarship program which excluded students pursuing a “degree in
devotional theology”).
52
Eugene Volokh, Equal Treatment Is Not Establishment, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL’Y 341 (1999).
53
CONAN, supra note 11, at 1122; see also, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village v.
Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 706–07 (1994) (“[A]ccommodation is not a principle without
limits . . . . [One limit is that] neutrality as among religions must be honored.”); Tex.
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (finding that state sales tax exemption
for religious publications violates the Establishment Clause) (plurality opinion);
Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788–89 (1973)
(holding that tuition reimbursement grants to parents of parochial school children
violate Establishment Clause).
54
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
55
Douglas Laycock, Churches, Playgrounds, Government Dollars—and Schools?, 131
HARV. L. REV. 133, 145 (2017).
56
Garnett & Blais, supra note 1, at 108.
57
Id.
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states (including Missouri) have constitutional provisions
prohibiting or limiting public funding of religious institutions
and activities.58 Modern Blaine Provisions59 are considered to
reflect “anti-Catholicism, nativism, and nationalism of the 19th
and early 20th centuries”60 and “there is ample evidence” that
rampant anti-Catholicism motivated many Blaine Provisions.61
B. Facts and Procedural History of Trinity Lutheran
The Missouri Department of Natural Resources offers
state grants to public and private schools, nonprofit daycare
centers, and other nonprofit entities.62 The grant money is used
to purchase rubber playground surfaces made from recycled
tires.63 Due to scarce resources, the Department awards a limited
number of grants on a competitive basis after scoring several
criteria.64
The Trinity Lutheran Church Child Learning Center,
initially established as a nonprofit organization in 1980, merged
with Trinity Lutheran Church in 1985 and operates under its
supervision on church property.65 The Center admits children
from any religion.66
In 2012, the Center decided to participate in Missouri’s
Scrap Tire Program to replace a significant portion of its
playground floor with a rubber surface.67 After describing the
58

See Meir Katz, The State of Blaine: A Closer Look at the Blaine Amendments and Their
Modern Application, 12 ENGAGE 111, 117 n.1 (2011),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/fedsoc-cmspublic/library/doclib/20110603_KatzEngage12.1.pdf (collecting citations); Toby J.
Heytens, Note, School Choice and State Constitutions, 86 VA. L. REV. 117, 123 n.32
(2000) (collecting various counts); see also Garnett & Blais, supra note 1, at 108.
59
For the rest of this note, Blaine Provisions and Baby Blaines will be referred to
collectively as “Blaine Provisions.”
60
Garnett & Blais, supra note 1, at 108; see also John T. McGreevy, A History of the
Culture’s Bias, Remarks at the Anti-Catholicism: The Last Acceptable Prejudice
Conference (May 24, 2002).
61
Laycock, supra note 55, at 166; see also, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828–
29 (2000) (plurality opinion).
62
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2017
(2017).
63
Id.
64
Id. These criteria include “the poverty level of the population in the surrounding
area and the applicant’s plan to promote recycling.” Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. The available facts make it unclear whether children from non-religious
backgrounds are banned. On the Center’s current website, a Parent Questionnaire
asks for church affiliation, whether the child has been baptized, when such baptism
occurred, and the child’s other religious experiences. See Parent Questionnaire 20172018, TRINITY LUTHERAN CHILD LEARNING CTR.,
https://tlclckids.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/parent-questionnaire-2017-18.pdf
(last visited May 4, 2018).
67
Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2017–18. The Center disclosed its status as a ministry
of Trinity Lutheran Church and explained that “the Center’s mission was ‘to provide
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playground and the safety hazards posed by its current surface,
the Center detailed the anticipated benefits of the proposed
project.68 The Center ranked fifth out of forty-four in the 2012
Scrap Tire Program and was poised to receive a grant.69
Despite its high score, “the Center was deemed
categorically ineligible to receive a grant.”70 The Department had
“a strict and express policy of denying grants to any applicant
owned or controlled by a church, sect, or other religious
entity.”71 The Department believed that the Missouri
Constitution compelled the policy.72 Article I, Section 7 of the
Missouri Constitution provides:
That no money shall ever be taken from the public
treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any
church, sect or denomination of religion, or in aid
of any priest, preacher, minister or teacher thereof,
as such; and that no preference shall be given to
nor any discrimination made against any church,
sect or creed of religion, or any form of religious
faith or worship.73
A rejection letter explained that “the Department could not
provide financial assistance directly to a church.”74 Because
Trinity Lutheran Church operated the Center, the Center could
not receive a grant.75
Trinity Lutheran sued the Director of the Department.76
The Church alleged that the Department’s failure to approve the
a safe, clean, and attractive school facility in conjunction with an educational
program structured to allow a child to grow spiritually, physically, socially, and
cognitively.’” Id.
68
The benefits included “increasing access to the playground for all children,
including those with disabilities, by providing a surface compliant with the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990; providing a safe, long-lasting, and resilient
surface under the play areas; and improving Missouri's environment by putting
recycled tires to positive use.” Id. at 2018. “The Center also noted that the benefits of
a new surface would extend beyond its students to the local community, whose
children often use the playground during non-school hours.” Id.
69
Id. “The Department ultimately awarded 14 grants as part of the 2012 program.
Because the Center was operated by Trinity Lutheran Church, it did not receive a
grant.” Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 2017.
72
Id.
73
MO. CONST. art. I, § 7. This language is similar to Blaine provisions throughout the
United States. See also Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2037–38 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (citing thirty-eight states with a similar provision).
74
Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2018.
75
Id.
76
Id.
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Center’s application violated the Free Exercise Clause.77 Trinity
Lutheran sought to prohibit the Department from discriminating
against the Church on that basis in any future grant
applications.78 The Department filed a motion to dismiss in
district court.79 Deciding against Trinity Lutheran, the district
court granted the motion and, on appeal, the Eighth Circuit
affirmed.80
III. THE DECISION
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit’s decision
and declared that Trinity Lutheran could receive the grant.81
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, noted that the
First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof . . . .”82 However, because the parties agreed that
the Establishment Clause did not prevent Missouri from
including Trinity Lutheran in the Scrap Tire Program, the Court
reasoned that there was no need to address the Establishment
Clause in its opinion.83
Rather, the Court focused its analysis entirely on the Free
Exercise Clause.84 The Court recognized that “there is ‘play in
the joints’ between what the Establishment Clause permits and
the Free Exercise Clause compels.”85 The Court outlined the
rigorous protection provided under the Free Exercise Clause.86
77

Id.
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 2018–19. The Eight Circuit recognized that it was “rather clear” that
Missouri could award a scrap tire grant to Trinity Lutheran without running afoul of
the Establishment Clause. Id. However, the Free Exercise Clause did not compel the
state to ignore the anti-establishment principle in its state Constitution. Id. The court
viewed a grant to a religious institution as a “hallmark[] of an established religion”
and held that religious status could be used to deny an application. Id. Judge
Gruender dissented and distinguished Locke narrowly because it concerned the issue
of funding for religious clergy training and “did not leave states with unfettered
discretion to exclude the religious from generally available public benefits.” Id. An
equally divided court denied a rehearing en banc. Id.
81
Id. at 2019.
82
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
83
Trinity Lutheran,137 S. Ct. at 2019.
84
Id.
85
Id. (citing Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004)). The origin of the “play in
the joints” phrase comes from Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
In Walz, the Court discussed First Amendment protections and pointed out that the
two guarantees are often in conflict. Id. Further, the Court held that it “will not
tolerate either governmentally established religion or governmental interference with
religion” and that “there is room for play in the joints . . . which will permit religious
exercise to exist without sponsorship.” Id. at 669.
86
Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2019–21.
78
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Laws are subjected to the strictest scrutiny when they target
religious observers for unequal treatment and special disabilities
based on their religious status.87 Only a state interest of the
highest order can justify denying a publically available benefit,
solely on account of religious identity, because it imposes a
penalty on the free exercise of religion.88 Conditioning the
availability of benefits upon a recipient’s willingness to surrender
his or her religious status effectively penalizes the free exercise of
constitutional liberties.89 The Court acknowledged that it had
rejected free exercise challenges when “the laws in question have
been neutral and generally applicable without regard to
religion.”90 However, the Court distinguished these laws from
“those that single out the religious for disfavored treatment,”
such as the Department’s policy.91
After reviewing general free exercise precedent, the Court
focused a large portion of its opinion on distinguishing Trinity
Lutheran from Locke v. Davey.92 In Locke, the Court allowed a state
to deny theology students access to a generally available college
scholarship program.93 As an example of “play in the joints,” the
state could have allowed theology students in its program while
not violating the Establishment Clause.94 However, despite
targeting theology students for exclusion, the decision “not to
fund” religious training did not offend the Free Exercise
Clause.95 The plaintiff in Locke “was not denied a scholarship
87

Id. at 2024 (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 533, 542 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).
88
Id. at 2019 (citing McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628, (1978) (plurality opinion)).
89
Id. at 2021.
90
Id. at 2020 (noting that in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,
485 U.S. 439, 449(1988), the Court held that individuals were not being “coerced by
the Government's action into violating their religious beliefs” and the Government
action did not “penalize religious activity by denying any person an equal share of
the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens”); see also id. (noting that
in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990) the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause did not entitle the church
members to not follow general criminal laws on account of their religion).
91
Id. at 2020–21 (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 532 (1993) (striking down facially neutral ordinances that outlawed certain
forms of animal slaughter because, despite their facial neutrality, the ordinances had
a discriminatory purpose to prohibit sacrificial rituals related to a specific religion but
disagreeable to other locals)).
92
Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2022–24.
93
Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
94
Id. at 720–21.
95
Id. (explaining that “[t]raining someone to lead a congregation is an essentially
religious endeavor”). Further, refusing to fund religious training was “far milder”
than other historical restrictions on religious practices that offend the Free Exercise
Clause. Id. (distinguishing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520 (1993) (law designed to restrict the ritual of a single minority religious
group); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (law barring ministers from serving as
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because of who he was; he was denied a scholarship because of
what he proposed to do—use the funds to prepare for the
ministry.”96
By contrast, in Trinity Lutheran, the funds would be used
to resurface a church-owned playground that is open to the
public.97 The Court held that excluding an otherwise qualified
church from a government grant program—on the basis of
religious status—violated the Free Exercise Clause.98 The
majority declared that “Trinity Lutheran was denied a grant
simply because of what it is—a church”99 and, applying strict
scrutiny, the Court found that “Missouri’s policy preference for
skating as far as possible from religious establishment concerns”
was not a compelling interest.100 Only a state interest “of the
highest order” would be acceptable, and the Free Exercise
Clause bars seeking greater separation of church and state
beyond the already existing Establishment Clause.101 The Court
quipped that the consequences of the State’s discriminatory
policy may have resulted in only, “in all likelihood, a few extra
scraped knees,”102 but excluding Trinity Lutheran “from a public
benefit for which it is otherwise qualified, solely because it is a
church, is odious to our Constitution . . . and cannot stand.”103
Despite a seven-two decision for Trinity Lutheran
Church, Footnote Three104 fractured the Justices.105 It provides:
“This case involves express discrimination based on religious
identity with respect to playground resurfacing. We do not
address religious uses of funding or other forms of
discrimination.”106 Footnote Three is meant to “carefully limit[]
the reach” of Trinity Lutheran, but the Justices disagreed on its
importance and influence.107
constitutional convention delegates); and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
(denying benefits to Sabbatarians)).
96
Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2023.
97
Id. at 2017–19.
98
Id. at 2023–25.
99
Id. at 2023.
100
Id. at 2024.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 2024–25 (comparing this to chains, torture, or denial of political office on
account of religion).
103
Id. at 2025.
104
“Footnote Three” is significant to this Note and will be capitalized.
105
Only four Justices, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Kagan,
joined the Court’s opinion and Footnote Three in full. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at
2016. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined the opinion, except for Footnote Three.
Id. Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Ginsburg wrote entirely separate opinions and
did not join Footnote Three. Id.
106
Id. at 2024 n.3 (plurality opinion).
107
See id. at 2025 (Thomas, J., concurring in part); see id. at 2025 (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring in part); see also Laycock, supra note 55, at 135. Recall that only four
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IV. THE FRACTURING FOOTNOTE, SCATHING DISSENT, AND
SCHOLARLY CRITICISM
A. The Concurrences
Three Justices concurred with the majority opinion but
disagreed on the reach of Footnote Three. Justices Thomas and
Gorsuch joined in each other’s concurrences and advocated for
a significantly broader holding.108 They agreed that whether a
grant recipient puts the money to religious use is irrelevant and
predicted that “a line barring religious use of money would be
unstable.”109 Justice Thomas took issue with the Court endorsing
Locke for even a “mild kind” of discrimination against religion.110
Justice Gorsuch leveled two criticisms at the majority opinion.111
First, he argued that the majority erred because “the Court leaves
open the possibility” that any “useful distinction might be drawn
between laws that discriminate on the basis of religious status and
religious use.”112 He argued that there was effectively no line
between status and use.113 Further, the difference was irrelevant
because the First Amendment allows for free exercise of religion,
which includes both status and use.114 Second, Justice Gorsuch
worried that Footnote Three might lead some to read that the
Court’s ruling applied only to cases involving a playground “or
only those with some association with children’s safety or health,
or perhaps some other social good we find sufficiently
worthy.”115 He believes that Footnote Three is “entirely
correct,”116 but that the general principles, in this case, do and
should apply to other instances of discrimination against
religious exercise.117 Justice Thomas agreed with Justice

Justices joined the Court’s opinion, and Footnote Three, in full. Supra note 105 and
accompanying test.
108
See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2025–26 (Thomas, J., concurring in part); id. at
2025 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part); see also Laycock, supra note 55, at 135.
109
Laycock, supra note 55, at 136; see also Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2025
(Thomas, J., concurring in part); 137 S. Ct. at 2025 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part).
110
See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2025 (Thomas, J., concurring in part).
Nevertheless, Justice Thomas joined the majority because the Court “appropriately
construe[d] Locke narrowly.” Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part).
111
Id. at 2025 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part).
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 2026.
115
Id.
116
This is likely based on the principle that judicial decisions are theoretically limited
to the facts of the case at bar.
117
Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2025 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part).
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Gorsuch’s criticism of Footnote Three,118 and both Justices
unmistakably desired a broader holding.119
Justice Breyer concurred only in the judgment and,
contrasted with Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, hinted that there
can be a limit to Free Exercise in this case.120 Initially, he
emphasized the Court’s ruling in Everson v. Board of Education,121
where the Court declared that depriving parochial schools of
such “general government services as ordinary police and fire
protection . . . is obviously not the purpose of the First
Amendment.”122 Justice Breyer equated Missouri’s Scrap Tire
program with the general government services in Everson that
provide a “public benefit” and should not be denied.123 However,
Justice Breyer hinted that Establishment Clause concerns may
arise if there is an “administrative or other reason to treat
churches differently.”124 Ultimately, in this case, he thought Free
Exercise was violated and the Court “need not go further” when
the sole reason for different treatment is faith.125
B. The Dissent
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, wrote a
spirited dissent.126 Justice Sotomayor argued that the Court
“slights both our precedents and our history, and its reasoning
weakens this country’s longstanding commitment to a separation
of church and state beneficial to both.”127 She further claimed
that “[t]he Court today profoundly changes that relationship by
holding, for the first time, that the Constitution requires the
government to provide public funds directly to a church.”128
On Establishment Clause grounds, Justice Sotomayor
strongly opposed the majority and criticized the Court for
ignoring the Establishment Clause portion of the analysis.129 She
provided additional facts, left out of the majority opinion,
regarding the religious purpose of the Church, Center, and
playground.130 Justice Sotomayor emphasized precedent that the
118

See Laycock, supra note 55, at 136.
See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2025 (Thomas, J., concurring in part); id. at
2025–26 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part).
120
Id. at 2026–27 (Breyer, J., concurring).
121
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
122
Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2026 (Breyer, J., concurring).
123
Id. at 2026–27.
124
Id. at 2027.
125
Id.
126
Id. at 2027 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 2029–30.
130
Id. at 2027–28. Specifically, she provided:
119
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government may not directly fund religious exercise, a rule that
is clearest when “funds flow directly from the public treasury to
a house of worship.”131 Unlike other cases involving the funding
of religious institutions, Trinity Lutheran did not “and cannot”
give assurances that they would not use the money for religious
activities.132 The State now will give “direct subsidies of religious
indoctrination, with all the attendant concerns that led to the
Establishment Clause.”133 Lastly, Justice Sotomayor believed
that this opinion would unconstitutionally lead to the
government showing preference to religious groups with “a belief
system that allows them to compete for public dollars” and
favors “those well-organized and well-funded enough to do so
successfully.”134
Justice Sotomayor also vehemently challenged the
Court’s reasoning under the Free Exercise Clause.135 She
supported the “play in the joints” doctrine136 but urged deference
Founded in 1922, Trinity Lutheran Church
(Church) operates . . . for the express purpose
of carrying out the commission of . . . Jesus
Christ as directed to His church on earth. . . .
The Church uses preaching, teaching, worship,
witness, service, and fellowship according to
the Word of God to carry out its mission to
make disciples. . . . The Church’s religious
beliefs include its desire to associat[e] with the
[Trinity Church Child] Learning Center. . . .
Located on Church property, the Learning
Center provides daycare and preschool for
about 90 children ages two to kindergarten. . . .
The Learning Center serves as a ministry of the
Church and incorporates daily religion and
developmentally appropriate activities into ...
[its] program. . . . In this way, [t]hrough the
Learning Center, the Church teaches a
Christian world view to children of members
of the Church, as well as children of nonmember residents of the area. . . . These
activities represent the Church’s sincere
religious belief . . . to use [the Learning Center]
to teach the Gospel to children of its members,
as well to bring the Gospel message to nonmembers.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alterations original).
131
Id. at 2028–29; see also Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (holding that
subsidizing the construction of facilities used for non-secular purposes would
advance religion, but the government may give money to religious universities if the
aid is of “nonideological character” and is a one-time grant that did not require
constant government surveillance).
132
Id.; see also, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
875–76 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (chronicling cases).
133
Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2031.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 2031–32.
136
Id.

593

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

to the states as to how to apply it.137 She reasoned that the states
initially funded houses of worship but over time restricted the
practice.138 Justice Sotomayor made numerous historical and
originalist arguments for allowing states to choose how to
navigate the “play in the joints.”139 Returning to Locke, Justice
Sotomayor emphasized that the reasoning for the decision in that
case was primarily based on “historic and substantial state
interest” supporting a state’s decision to not give funds directly
to a church.140 She noted that “[a]lmost all of the [s]tates that
ratified the Religion Clauses” had that rule, and thirty-eight
states today have provisions similar to Missouri’s Article I,
Section 7.141 She considered separation of church and state to be
a compelling interest.142 Justice Sotomayor agreed with Justice
Breyer’s concurrence in principle,143 but disagreed that this case
did not involve a true generally available public benefit because
it only “selective[ly] benefits a few recipients a year.”144 For that
reason, she believed the comparison to Everson was “inapt.”145
Justice Sotomayor concluded that the Court “blinds itself
to the outcome . . . history requires and leads us . . . to a place
where separation of church and state is a constitutional slogan,
not a constitutional commitment.”146
C. Summary of Scholarly Criticism
Many scholars have commented on the Trinity Lutheran
decision. Some hail the decision for expanding religious
freedoms147 and that “religious conservatives are happy” with the
outcome.148 However, some commentators disagree with Trinity
Lutheran and decry the decision for wearing down the wall

137

See id. at 2032–33. This is in line with the original intent. See supra notes 12–13 and
accompanying text.
138
Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2032–35 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The course of
this history shows that those who lived under the laws and practices that formed
religious establishments made a considered decision that civil government should not
fund ministers and their houses of worship.”).
139
See id.
140
Id. at 2035–36 (quoting Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004)) (emphasis
added).
141
Id. at 2037.
142
Id. at 2040–41.
143
The principle being that denying a “generally available benefit” solely on account
of religious status requires strict scrutiny. Id. at 2040.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 2041.
147
E.g., Garnett & Blais, supra note 1, at 105; id. at 121 (calling the decision “long
overdue”).
148
Jonathan F. Mitchell, Judicial Review and the Future of Federalism, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1091, 1101 (2017).
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between church and state.149 One scholar calls Trinity Lutheran
“deeply disturbing” and a “dramatic change in the law.”150
Another criticizes the Court for not addressing the Establishment
Clause in any substantive manner.151 An additional writer
predicts that the vague status/use distinction will be important
in government programs that officially discriminate against
religious entities.152
Almost all commentators mention Footnote Three, and
some specifically note its oddity.153 One writer believes that
Footnote Three was needed to secure Justice Breyer’s vote.154
Another scholar has little faith in Footnote Three’s ability to
limit the Trinity Lutheran holding.155 Some agree with Justice
Sotomayor’s point that, despite Footnote Three’s limiting
language, Trinity Lutheran eroded federalism by shifting state
decision-making on religion to the Supreme Court.156 Another
scholar highlights that Footnote Three reserved deciding two
main issues.157 One issue is whether funding religious schools
entails “religious use of funding,”158 and the other is the general
149

See e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 360–61.
Id. at 358.
151
Leslie Griffin, Symposium: Bad News from Trinity Lutheran—Only Two Justices
Support the Establishment Clause, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 26, 2017, 5:44 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/symposium-bad-news-trinity-lutheran-twojustices-support-establishment-clause/. One commentator proposes that past case law
suggests this limit is inherent through precedent. Laycock, supra note 55, at 141.
152
See Garnett & Blais supra note 1, at 105.
153
E.g., Laycock, supra note 55, at 160 (“But of course the holding is not limited to
playground resurfacing.”); Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword, 1930s Redux: The
Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 29 (2017) (calling it “an oddly
specific limit”).
154
Metzger, supra note 153, at 29.
155
Frank Ravitch, Symposium: Trinity Lutheran and Zelman—Saved by Footnote 3 or a
Dream Come True for Voucher Advocates?, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 26, 2017, 10:59 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/symposium-trinity-lutheran-church-v-comerzelman-v-simmons-harris-saved-footnote-3-dream-come-true-voucher-advocates/.
156
See Mitchell, supra note 148, at 1101; Metzger, supra note 153, at 29 (arguing that
Trinity Lutheran continues a “siege” on the administrative state.); see also supra notes
135–45 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Sotomayor’s view).
157
Laycock, supra note 55, at 157–58.
158
Id. at 161–64 (emphasis added). Before the decision was handed down this was a
major concern. See, e.g., Valerie Strauss, Will the Supreme Court’s Trinity Decision Lead
to the Spread of School Voucher Programs?, WASH. POST. (June 26, 2017)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2017/06/26/will-thesupreme-courts-trinity-decision-lead-to-the-spread-of-school-voucher-programs; see
also Brief for the National Education Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 1, Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 137 S. Ct.
2012 (2017) (No. 15-577), 2016 WL 3667053; Brief for Douglas County School
District and Douglas County School Board as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
1, Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017) (No.
15-577), 2016 WL 1639719. Some do not want the Trinity Lutheran holding extended
to require states to allow students to use generally available school-vouchers at
private religious schools. See William S. Koski, Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer
Decision: What Does It Mean for School Vouchers?, STANFORD LAW SCH. BLOGS: LEGAL
150
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constitutionality of discriminating against religion.159 Future
Court decisions will need to address these issues.
V. CREATING A NEW TEST
A. Reflecting on Criticism
The Trinity Lutheran decision has generated much
criticism and disagreement.160 After Trinity Lutheran, at a
minimum, the government is able to “limit the extent
government funds can be put to religious use” but “cannot
discriminate based on one’s religious status.”161 Also,
discriminating on religious status would unconstitutionally “put
the recipient of a government benefit to the choice between
maintaining that status or receiving a government benefit.”162
Justices and commentators in Section IV widely accept these two
principles,163 but the primary problems lay with the Trinity
Lutheran decision and how it should be limited.164 The three main
flashpoints from the case are disregarding the Establishment
Clause and federal deference to the states,165 the utility and limits
of Footnote Three,166 and distinguishing status against use.167
(July 4, 2017), https://law.stanford.edu/2017/07/04/trinity-lutheranchurch-v-comer-decision-what-does-it-mean-for-school-vouchers/ (“[S]chool voucher
advocates and opponents alike view this case as a marker for whether the Supreme
Court will require states to allow parents and children to use publicly funded school
vouchers for religious schools.”). On the other hand, some feel the principles in
Trinity Lutheran should be extended to allow funding for religious schools. See, e.g.,
Laycock, supra note 55, at 162–63. Further, Locke may eventually be overruled or
narrowly confined to the facts of that case. Id. at 169 (describing Locke as applicable
only to barring funding for training of religious clergy at universities).
159
Laycock, supra note 55, at 164–68; see also Erin Hawley, Symposium: Putting Some
Limits on the “Play in the Joints,” SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 26, 2017, 5:28 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/symposium-putting-limits-play-joints/
(describing Blaine provisions as being on “shaky footing” and in jeopardy).
Specifically, Blaine provisions may appear facially neutral, but if they have a “bad
motive,” they should be struck down. Laycock, supra note 55, at 166–68. Another
scholar argues that Blaine provisions were inherently made with animus, but wants
them struck down on narrower non-discrimination grounds, like in Trinity Lutheran.
Garnett & Blais, supra note 1, at 105, 125–27.
160
See discussion supra Section III.
161
CONAN, supra note 11, at 1123 (emphasis added).
162
Id. (emphasis added).
163
See discussion supra Section III. With the exceptions of Justices Thomas and
Gorsuch, who textually believe that the government cannot limit religious use of a
generally available public benefit. See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v.
Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2025 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part); see id. at 2025–
26 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part).
164
See id.
165
See discussion supra Section III.B (summarizing Justice Sotomayor’s dissent).
166
See discussion supra Section III.A (summarizing Justice Gorsuch, Justice Thomas,
and scholars’ criticism of Footnote Three).
167
See supra notes 111–13, 118, 152, and accompanying text (summarizing Justice
Gorsuch, Justice Thomas, and one scholar’s discussion of the status/use distinction).
AGGREGATE
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First, Trinity Lutheran reduced the Establishment Clause
to mere ink on paper. Because the parties agreed that there is no
Establishment issue, the Court washed its hands of the Clause.168
This is fundamentally wrong.169 “Constitutional questions are
decided by [the Supreme] Court, not the parties’ concessions.”170
The Court shirked its emphatic “province and duty . . . to say
what the law is.”171 “If two laws conflict with each other,”172 such
as the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause,173 “the
courts must decide on the operation of each.”174 Justice
Sotomayor was correct that the “Court’s silence on this front
signals either its misunderstanding of the facts of this case or a
startling departure from our precedents.”175 Likewise, Justice
Breyer rightfully acknowledged that the Establishment Clause
limits the reach of this decision.176 Additionally, the original
intent of the Religion Clauses left the issue of religion to the
states.177 For this reason, the Court should give deference to the
states for how to handle the “play in the joints” between the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, as the Court has
historically done.178
Second, Footnote Three was a disservice to judicial
opinion writing. It unnecessarily fractured the Court into five
different opinions179 and failed its objective of limiting the
168

Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2019.
See Griffin, supra note 151.
170
Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2028 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
171
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
172
Id.
173
See cases cited supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing extending the
Clauses to their extremes).
174
Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
175
Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2028 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
176
Id. at 2027 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating “there [is not] any
administrative or other reason to treat” Trinity Lutheran different from the schools in
Everson). Although, unlike Justice Sotomayor, he correctly allowed funding for the
Center’s playground resurfacing. Compare Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2026–27
(explaining that the applicability of Everson and that the Scrap Tire Program is a
generally available public benefit), with Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2040
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with Justice Breyer’s characterization).
Justice Sotomayor’s reasoning fails because inherently, any generally available
benefit is a selectively available benefit, and vice versa. Any public benefit has scarce
resources and requires some selective decision-making. For example, police officers
prioritize what streets to patrol and how many officers need to respond to an
emergency. Separately, Justice Sotomayor’s church-state separation concerns are
valid, but she does not give enough weight, in this case, to the penalty against Free
Exercise. See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2027–41 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
177
See supra notes 11–17 and accompanying text.
178
See supra notes 129–42 and accompanying text (Justice Sotomayor outlining
precedents and history). The Court has recognized states’ “historical and substantial
state interest” in a separation of church and state. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712,
169

725 (2004).
179

See discussion supra Section III (discussing Footnote Three).
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opinion’s reach.180 As Justice Breyer noted in his concurrence,
“administrative or other reasons” (i.e. Establishment Clause
problems) would allow for treating religious parties differently.181
The Court should have addressed this issue instead of causing
embarrassing scholarly criticism and a scathing dissent. Footnote
Three is a farce.
Third, finding the line between religious status and
religious use will be critical in future cases.182 The status-use
distinction is critical because, despite Justices Thomas’s and
Gorsuch’s belief that the difference is irrelevant,183 at least six
other Justices will prefer to use this line-drawing in cases where
a public benefit is denied to a religious party.184 Overall, the
Court needs to address these three problems in future cases
where the government denies a public benefit based on religion.
B. The “Seesaw Test”
The Seesaw Test is my proposal for a new “play in the
joints” test, suitable for instances where the government seeks to
deny a public benefit to a religious party. Given that Trinity
Lutheran inspired the balancing, or seesawing, nature of this test,
naming it after the playground equipment is appropriate. The
Seesaw Test resolves the criticisms described in detail above.
This test is needed because “shoehorning” all Free Exercise and
Establishment Clause cases into one test is inappropriate,185 and
instead, “different contexts . . . call for different approaches.”186
The reason is that “shoehorning new problems into a test that
does not reflect the special concerns raised by those problems
tends to deform the language of the test.”187 This is what the
Trinity Lutheran Court did188 that led to the criticism summarized
180

See discussion supra Section III.C (discussing scholars ignoring the impact of the
footnote and speculating on how the opinion can be applied to other forms of
discrimination against religion).
181
See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2027 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
182
See supra Section III.C (discussing scholars raising issues about Blaine provisions
and school funding).
183
Laycock, supra note 55, at 136; see also Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2025
(Thomas, J., concurring in part); 137 S. Ct. at 2025–26 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in
part).
184
See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2017–25 (opinion of the Court); id. at 2026–41
(opinions of Breyer, J., concurring and Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
185
See Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 719 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
186
See CONAN, supra note 11, at 1077; see also Grumet, 512 U.S. at 719 (1994)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
187
Grumet, 512 U.S. at 719 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) (“[I]t is more useful to recognize the relevant concerns in each case
on their own terms, rather than trying to squeeze them into language that does not
really apply to them.”).
188
See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2022.
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in Section VA. Shoehorning a strict scrutiny test for when a party
is denied a public benefit based on religion deforms strict scrutiny
because it does not adequately address the historic, traditional,
and substantial state interest of avoiding an establishment of
religion.189 In the area of “special concern” of denying funds to
religious parties, the Seesaw Test provides clear guidance for
lawmakers, remains within the holding of Trinity Lutheran by
distinguishing between status and use, and addresses the
concerns of the scholarly criticism and concurring and dissenting
Justices.
The Seesaw Test has two parts. First, the Court should
balance both sides to decide whether the public benefit was
denied because of past or present religious status or future religious
use.190 Second, the weight shifts either against the government or
the religious party. If the denial was based on religious status, then
the government must show excessive entanglement or
endorsement.191 However, if the denial was based on religious use,
then the religious party must show minimal entanglement and
incidental endorsement.192
In short, part one is a balancing test between the two
parties, and part two is a form of intermediate scrutiny against
the losing party. A two-part test using modified intermediate
scrutiny provides for more clarity and consensus than
shoehorning this issue into an overbroad strict scrutiny
analysis.193 Some balancing will allow for deference to state
interests, while modified intermediate scrutiny is a desirable
middle ground between the strict scrutiny both Religion clauses
demand.
In situations where the government denies a public
benefit to a religious party, modified intermediate scrutiny is
needed to remain consistent with other analogous constitutional
conflicts. When the government has an express power delegated
from the people, but using the power infringes a reserved
constitutional right, then the resulting test occasionally is a
189

See generally id. at 2028–40 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
This is meant to address the initial “play in the joints” issue and the balancing of
the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses on the fulcrum of status and use. This
may also be considered the Free Exercise step.
191
Effectively, the government needs to show that there are traditional endorsement
and Lemon entanglement problems. This gives the government a fair chance to argue
that denying based on status is necessary to avoid Establishment problems.
192
Effectively, the religious party needs to show that there are not traditional
endorsement or Lemon entanglement problems. This gives the religious party a fair
chance to argue that the religious use does not cause Establishment problems.
193
See supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing fracturing). For example,
applying rational basis to the situation in O’Brien would not adequately consider free
speech, and strict scrutiny in Central Hudson would not adequately consider the state’s
power to regulate commerce.
190
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middle-ground variant of intermediate scrutiny.194 For example,
in United States v. O’Brien,195 the Court created a modified
intermediate scrutiny test to balance whether laws regulating
conduct, which fall under minimal rationality, interfere with free
speech, which triggers strict scrutiny.196 Also, in Central Hudson
Gas and Electric Corp. v. New York Public Service Commission,197 the
Court walked back the strict scrutiny standard from Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.198
Instead, the Central Hudson test balances whether laws regulating
advertising, which is commercial activity under rational basis
analysis, violates free speech, which calls for strict scrutiny.
Here, the Court can walk back the Trinity Lutheran strict scrutiny
standard as it did in Central Hudson after the Virginia Board
decision.199 Similar to the conflicts in O’Brien and Central Hudson,
the Establishment Clause gives the government the power and
prerogative to prevent an establishment of religion, but is
countered by not being able to infringe against Free Exercise
rights. Thus, modified intermediate scrutiny, recognizing states’
substantial interest, is a proper test for when the government
denies a public benefit to a religious party.
Multiple sections and terms within the Seesaw Test need
explanation. Part one addresses the Free Exercise implication.
First, a “denied public benefit” in this test involves no distinction
between “generally available” and “selective” benefits.200
Contrary to Sotomayor’s attack on Breyer,201 all government
benefits use scarce resources, and deciding how to use scarce
resources always involves prioritization and selection. For
194

For examples of modified intermediate scrutiny tests, see Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n., 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (The four steps are: (1)
Is the expression protected by the First Amendment, concerning a lawful activity,
and not misleading? (2) Is the asserted governmental interest substantial? (3) Does
the regulation directly advance the governmental interest asserted? (4) Is the
regulation more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest? There must be a
“reasonable fit” between the government’s ends and the means for achieving those
ends.); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (The law in question must be
within the constitutional power of the government to enact; further an important or
substantial government interest; that interest must be unrelated to the suppression of
speech; and prohibit no more speech than is essential to further that interest.).
195
391 U.S. 367 (1968) (symbolic conduct).
196
197

Id. at 376–77.

447 U.S. 557, 561–63 (1980) (commercial speech).
198
425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976) (“It is clear, for example, that speech does not lose its
First Amendment protection because money is spent to project it, as in a paid
advertisement of one form or another.”).
199
See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561–63 (1980) (undoing the strict scrutiny standard
from Virginia Board).
200
See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2040–
41 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing Justice Sotomayor’s comparison of
the two concepts).
201
Id.
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example, police protection services prioritize and select how to
distribute their “generally available” benefits. Thus, all benefits
are selective and any distinction between “generally available
benefits” and “selective benefits” is meaningless in the grand
scheme of Free Exercise rights.
Second, “lines must be drawn,”202 and the first line the
Trinity Lutheran Court chose was status and use.203 When the
Court distinguished Locke, the crux of its reasoning had two
segments. One, the religious party in Locke was not denied a
public benefit because of who he “was”; he was denied the benefit
because of what he “proposed to do—use” the benefit “to prepare
for” a future religious objective.204 Two, the Department denied
Trinity Lutheran’s application because “of what [Trinity
Lutheran] is—a church.”205 “Was” and “is” imply the past and
present. “Do” implies the future. If the focus for denial is based
on the past or present criteria, then it is likely based on status.
Alternatively, if the decision depends on future criteria, then it is
likely based on use. The timing distinction gives a useful
guideline for the Justices when considering the unique
circumstances of each case. Temporally framing the status/use
line solves Justices Gorsuch and Thomas’ primary concern that
no workable distinction can be made between status/use.206
Part two of the Seesaw Test addresses the Establishment
Clause, which was entirely left out of the Trinity Lutheran
majority opinion.207 This part ensures that there is some
accounting for both Religion Clauses and allows for the states to
retain some control over the “play in the joints.”208 There are
many terms of art in part two that will use the following
202

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971) (noting the inevitability of some
degree of entanglement and involvement).
203
A distinction must be made between status and use to remain within the holdings
of Trinity Lutheran and Locke. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2023.
204
Id.
205
Id. (emphasis added).
206
See id. at 2025 (Thomas, J., concurring with Gorsuch, J.); id. at 2025–26 (Gorsuch,
J., concurring in part) (“[T]he Court leaves open the possibility a useful distinction
might be drawn between laws that discriminate on the basis of religious status and
religious use. Respectfully, I harbor doubts about the stability of such a line. Does a
religious man say grace before dinner? Or does a man begin his meal in a religious
manner? Is it a religious group that built the playground? Or did a group build the
playground so it might be used to advance a religious mission? The distinction blurs
in much the same way the line between acts and omissions can blur when stared at
too long, leaving us to ask (for example) whether the man who drowns by awaiting
the incoming tide does so by act (coming upon the sea) or omission (allowing the sea
to come upon him). Often enough the same facts can be described both ways.”)
(internal citations omitted).
207
Id., 137 S. Ct. at 2029–30 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
208
See id. at 2032–38 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing moving decision-making
over religion away from the states).
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definitions.
“Excessive
entanglement”
entails
an
“[i]mpermissible merging, involvement, or intermixing of the
spheres of government and religion whereby state and church
functions are blurred or caused to overlap.”209 This can include
government intrusion “into an organization’s religious
administration, authority, concerns, or rights;”210 complicated
administrative involvement;211 or potential disagreement
regarding religious matters between religious parties and
government agents.212 Essentially, entanglement is the concern
of “repeated governmental intrusion into the inner workings of a
religious institution.”213 “Endorsement” is when government
appears to “favor, prefer, or promote” a particular religion “over
other beliefs.”214
“Minimal entanglement” and “incidental endorsement”
are essentially antonyms I created215 for excessive entanglement
and endorsement. Minimal entanglement is a one-time isolated
interaction between the state and religion and implies that there
is no excessive entanglement. Incidental endorsement is favoring
a particular belief system no more than the government would
favor another similarly situated belief system. This allows for the
government to, as it historically has done,216 favor organized
religions with a belief system that allows for receipt of
government benefits.217
VI. REVIEWING THE “SEESAW TEST”
A. Riding the Seesaw
Playing with the Seesaw Test highlights two major
aspects of it. Part one is quick, formalistic, and text-based. Part
two is slow, functionalist, and fact-based.
209

Excessive Entanglement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also Walz v.
Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970) (Ask “whether the involvement is excessive,
and whether it is a continuing one calling for official and continuing surveillance
leading to an impermissible degree of entanglement.”).
210
Excessive Entanglement, supra note 209.
211
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613–19 (1971); Walz, 397 U.S. at 675
(including whether impermissible “official and continuing surveillance” is required).
212
Waltz, 397 U.S. at 674–75
213
Michael A. Helfand, Litigating Religion, 93 B.U. L. REV. 493, 551 (2013); see also
Walz, 397 U.S. at 675.
214
Endorsement Test, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also Allegheny
Cty v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 626–32 (1989) (describing the endorsement test).
215
216

To my knowledge, these terms are novel creations.

See, e.g., Walz, 397 U.S. at 664 (allowing for tax-exempt status to organizations
with belief systems that allow for taxation).
217
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2031
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing the problem of the government showing a
preference for such belief systems over systems that do not).
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Part one will often be quickly dispatched because a
textual provision, responsible for the government denying a
public benefit to a religious party, will either allow for some aid
to religion, or bar all such aid. Blanket bans on aiding religion
paint with too broad a brush.218 Consistent with Trinity Lutheran¸
if the statute, provision, or administrative policy does not allow
any money to go to religions, then it inherently discriminates
based on religious status. Although there is no entitlement to
government public benefits for exercising a right,219 once a public
benefit is made available, the government cannot deny it solely
because of religious status.220 Additional language or actions will
also be indicative of whether the discrimination focuses on past
or present information versus future intent to use the aid. For
example, an application for aid could not have a check-box
saying, “I am/I was part of ‘X’ religious organization.” On the
other hand, the form could inquire into future intent for using the
aid. An example is a government program allowing for aid to
renovate historic landmarks while requiring disclosure of
whether the funds will be used to renovate a church.221 This
draws from Locke, which stands for the principle that the
government is allowed to deny aid to a theology student, not for
his past or present religious beliefs, but because of his intent to
use the money for a future religious purpose.
Under part two, the type and nature of the public benefit
denied to the religious party will require an individualized factspecific inquiry. The form and duration of aid will be the main
factor in whether, if the denial was based on status, there will be
excessive entanglement or endorsement, or whether, if the denial
was based on future use, there will be only minimal
entanglement and incidental endorsement. One-time cash
transfers will not lead to entanglement because such transfers do
not require long-term continuous surveillance or involvement
into the affairs of a religion. Further, provided there are no
special “plus” factors given to favor religious entities, a
reasonable person would not consider the transfer an
endorsement. The purpose for the aid may also be used to argue
218

See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2025 (holding that barring aid solely on account
of religion is unconstitutional).
219
See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991); Regan v. Taxation With
Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983) (“[A] legislature's decision not to
subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right.”); Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 n.19 (1980) (“A refusal to fund protected activity, without
more, cannot be equated with the imposition of a ‘penalty’ on that activity.”).
220
Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2025.
221
See id. at 2029 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (conceding that funding may “[come]
with assurances that public funds would not be used for religious activity, despite the
religious nature of the institution”).
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that, although the aid is for religious use, the reason for the aid
would show minimal endorsement. Some examples are disasterrelief funds for rebuilding a destroyed church,222 fire/police
protection services,223 and playground-resurfacing.224
The specific example of school-vouchers fully illustrates
both parts of the Seesaw Test. Under part one, the court should
balance both sides to decide whether the public benefit was
denied because of past or present religious status or future
religious use. The language outlining how the school-vouchers
may be used will be critical. If the language bars using them for
any religious school or denies the voucher because of the
person’s religious status, then that is overbroad and results in the
“status” analysis. However, if the language allows the voucher
to be used for religious schools and does not deny giving the
voucher to religious people, then that would likely move to the
“use” analysis. Under part two, the weight either shifts against
the government or the religious party. If the denial was based on
religious status, then the government must show excessive
entanglement or endorsement. However, if the denial was based
on religious use, then the religious party must show minimal
entanglement and incidental endorsement. For school-vouchers
this will require significant inquiry into the available schools,
pervasiveness of religion in those schools, and intent of the
student or student’s parents. When denied based on status, the
government needs to show that excessive entanglement and
endorsement of religious education will occur. When denied
based on use, the religious student or parents needs to show that
their use of the voucher will only cause incidental endorsement
or minimal entanglement. Ultimately, the result will depend on
the unique situation of the government, schools, and religious
parties.
B. How States Should Play on the Seesaw
The primary beneficiaries of the Seesaw Test will be the
states. In light of Trinity Lutheran, the Blaine Provisions of most
states will need to be amended.225 As courts do not generally
write our laws, the onus will fall on state legislatures to make
these changes in response to Trinity Lutheran. Any Blaine
Provisions that entirely deny generally available public benefits
222

Josh Gerstein, FEMA Broadens Churches' Access to Disaster Funds, POLITICO (Jan. 3,
2018, 9:27 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/01/03/churches-disasterfunds-fema-religion-establishment-321202.
223
Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2026–27 (Breyer, J., concurring).
224
Id. at 2024–25.
225
See id. at 2037 n.10 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (compiling a list of other states
with Blaine provisions).
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to religious groups are in severe jeopardy.226 Blaine Provisions
that are adjusted to follow the Seesaw Test will most likely
remain valid because they will not deny funding solely because
of “religious status.”227 The cost of not changing the provisions
will be expensive litigation for the states and loss of religious
freedom for the people.
Blaine Provisions must change because most of them are
overbroad in not distinguishing between religious status and use.
If they are not amended, they will fail under the Seesaw Test for
discriminating against religions solely because of status.
Likewise, they will follow the result in Trinity Lutheran where
Missouri’s Blaine Provision was overbroad.228 Missouri wrongly
denied government financial aid of any kind to a religious
party.229 As a model provision, the following modified Missouri
provision will pass the Seesaw Test, Trinity Lutheran, and judicial
scrutiny:
That no money shall ever be taken from the public
treasury, directly or indirectly, for future religious
use by any church, sect or denomination of
religion, or any priest, preacher, minister or
teacher thereof, as such; and that no preference
shall be given to nor any discrimination made
against any church, sect or creed of religion, or any
form of religious faith or worship. A party’s past or
present religious status shall not be used as criterion for
denying aid or benefits.230
The two simple edits, indicated in italics, adjust the provision to
follow the language of Trinity Lutheran and highlight the
temporal difference between status and use. The original
language strikes a good balance between Free Exercise (language
barring discrimination) and Establishment (barring all funds to
religion), but the provision needs to include a status/use
distinction and emphasize that status cannot be used for denying
benefits. This change will help states avoid litigation costs,
continue avoiding establishment issues, and allow for some aid
to religious parties.

226

227

See Hawley, supra note 159.

Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2024.

Id. at 2025 (striking Article I, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution).
229
Id.
230
This is a modified version of MO. CONST. art. I, § 7. The original language is
similar to Blaine provisions throughout the United States. See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S.
Ct. at 2037–38 n.11 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing thirty-eight states with a
similar provision).
228
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C. Weaknesses of the Seesaw Test
A seesaw is a fun playground toy, but it has its
disadvantages. It cannot be moved and only serves a singular
purpose; the Seesaw Test has similar weaknesses. Unlike the
pure Lemon, endorsement, coercion, or strict scrutiny tests, the
Seesaw Test can only be used for one type of case: when the
government denies public benefits to a religious party. The other
tests are far broader and can be used in a multitude of contexts.231
However, the Seesaw Test is tailored for a specific purpose, and
it will serve that purpose better than if the courts try to shoehorn
cases like Trinity Lutheran into the other tests. Also, the test is
inapplicable in cases where the government wants to aid or
otherwise accommodate religion.232 In those cases, the courts
should not use the Seesaw Test and can return to Lemon,
endorsement, coercion, or strict scrutiny for guidance. The
Seesaw Test is not a multi-tool; it is a shield for protecting
religious parties from state discrimination while blocking an
establishment of religion.
VII. CONCLUSION
In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Trinity
Lutheran, the Seesaw Test is the best option moving forward. The
Court in Trinity Lutheran failed to consider the Establishment
Clause, give deference to the states, create an unfractured Court
opinion, or give adequate clarity on the difference between status
and use. The Seesaw Test defers to the states and gives guidance
to lawmakers on distinguishing status and use while fully
considering the Establishment Clause implications, which will
lead to more unified opinions.233 States should adapt their laws
and policies to pass the Seesaw Test because it embraces the
holding of Trinity Lutheran and will help states avoid expensive
litigation as they try to defend overbroad Blaine Provisions and
other anti-religious practices. This test allows the government to
find its own “‘play in the joints’ between what the Establishment
Clause permits and the Free Exercise Clause compels.”234 The
courts should never ignore the Establishment Clause where the
government denies a public benefit to a religious party. On a
seesaw, children learn the ideas of balance and weight. When
finding “play in the joints” here, only the Seesaw Test can
balance the weight of the Religion Clauses.
231

Such contexts range from school prayer, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), to
Ten Commandment monuments, Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005), to
Christmas displays, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
232
E.g., Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668–69 (1970).
233
See discussion supra Section III (noting fractured opinions under the current test).
234
Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2019.

